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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
r _ j 
CENNETH NOLAN SHREWSBURY, : Case No. 950312-CA 
Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Kenneth Shrewsbury replies to the 
State's brief as follows. Issues which are not analyzed in this 
reply brief were adequately addressed in Appellant's opening 
brief or do not otherwise require a reply. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A traditional harmless error review does not apply to a 
trial court's erroneous refusal to ask an appropriate voir dire 
question. The correct standard for reversibility where a trial 
judge refused to ask an appropriate voir dire question is whether 
"the appellant's right to the informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges has been 'substantially impaired.'" Barrett v. 
Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah App. 1993), citing Hornsbv v. 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
In making that determination, this Court considers 
whether under "the totality of questioning, counsel [is not] 
afforded an adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors." 
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102-103 (citations omitted). 
The questions requested in this case were appropriate 
since they were designed to elicit information about the jurors' 
biases regarding the use of marijuana or free agency beliefs. 
Shrewsbury would have been able to intelligently exercise his 
peremptory challenges had he known whether any of the jurors were 
strongly opposed to the use of marijuana or had strong feelings 
about free agency beliefs. The concern with such information is 
that jurors holding such beliefs may be less likely to 
impartially weigh the evidence; as a defendant who was allowed to 
present these defenses, Shrewsbury had an interest in knowing 
whether potential jurors strongly opposed such beliefs. 
The broad questions asked by the judge were not aimed at 
eliciting this information. Therefore, Shrewsbury's right to 
intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges was 
substantially impaired by the trial judge's refusal to ask 
questions aimed at eliciting this information. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ASK 
APPROPRIATE VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS REQUIRES A NEW 
TRIAL IN THIS CASE WHERE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ASK OTHER QUESTIONS AIMED AT ELICITING THE SAME 
INFORMATION AND THE FAILURE TO ASK THE QUESTIONS 
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO AN 
INFORMED EXERCISE OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
In footnote 6 on page 16 of its brief, the State claims: 
Even if it was error to refuse defendant's 
requested questions, the error was at most 
harmless. "An error is harmful if the likelihood 
of a different result is 'sufficiently high to 
2 
undermine confidence in the verdict. ' " [citation 
omitted]. 
:ate's brief at 16. The State's standard for reversibility is 
ncorrect pursuant to Barrett, Hornsby and cases cited therein. 
In Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, this Court 
eiterated the standard for reversibility where a trial judge 
*efused to ask an appropriate voir dire question. 
However, " [s]ubstantial impairment of the right 
to informed exercise of peremptory challenges is 
reversible error." Hornsby v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 
1988). Accordingly, we must reverse if 
"'considering the totality of the questioning, 
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity 
to gain the information necessary to evaluate the 
jurors.'" Id. at 932 (quoting State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)). 
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103. 
This Court expressly rejected the appellee's claim in 
Barrett that "a trial court's voir dire ruling and subsequent 
entry of judgment may be reversed only if appellant demonstrates 
that the absence of error committed below would have resulted in 
a different outcome." Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103. Indeed, the 
Barrett court pointed out that "such a standard is impossible to 
apply in the context of voir dire questioning." Id. 
An appellant claiming that the trial court's 
unreasonable limitation of voir dire 
substantially impaired his ability to exercise 
peremptory challenges simply cannot prove, in the 
traditional way, that prejudice resulted from the 
error. Appellant cannot show with any certainty 
that had certain questions been asked, particular 
responses would have been received; that certain 
jurors would then have been challenged for cause 
or peremptorily; and that particular, more 
favorably predisposed jurors would have been 
seated instead, who would have deliberated to a 
3 
different result. Accordingly, in this context, 
we apply the test enunciated in Hornsby: 
Prejudicial error is shown if the appellant's 
right to the informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges has been "substantially impaired." 
758 P.2d at 933. 
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103. Hence, in Barrett. this Court 
expressly rejected the standard for reversibility which is 
articulated by the State in footnote 6 of its brief. 
The correct inquiry in determining whether to reverse a 
conviction based on the trial court's refusal to ask an 
appropriate voir dire question is a determination of whether 
"considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] 
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate the jurors." Id. This Court held in 
Barrett that reversible error occurred where the trial judge did 
not ask preliminary tort reform questions because counsel was not 
given an adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors for use of 
peremptory challenges based on the totality of the questioning. 
In the present case, the requested questions about 
marijuana use and flight were proper because they were designed 
to elicit responses which would inform Appellant of any strong 
beliefs held by potential jurors regarding the \ase of marijuana 
or free agency concepts. This would have aided Appellant in 
intelligently exercising his peremptory challenges. 
The State claims that the questions which were asked 
"provided defendant with adequate information to evaluate juror 
bias and to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges." 
State's brief at 13. The State then relies on general questions 
4 
Ltnilar to those relied on by the appellee in Barrett. 
In Barrett, this Court rejected the claim that the 
otality of questioning adequately addressed appellant's 
oncerns, pointing out that the trial court 
asked only broad questions concerning the 
prospective jurors' ability to be fair and 
impartial. As a result of this limited line of 
questioning, appellant was wholly unable to 
determine which, if any, prospective jurors had 
been exposed to tort reform propaganda, much less 
whether that exposure produced hidden or 
subconscious biases affecting their ability to 
render a fair and impartial verdict. 
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 103. 
The general questions relied on by the State in the 
present case are also broad questions aimed only at determining 
whether jurors can be fair and impartial and not at the specific 
information sought by Appellant. Indeed, the State claims that 
Shrewsbury's requested questions about marijuana and free agency 
were unnecessary because: 
The court asked the venire whether: (1) they 
could not listen fairly and weigh impartially the 
evidence in reaching a verdict; (2) they or their 
immediate family members had been charged or 
convicted of a felony; (3) they or their family 
members had ever been the subject of an 
automobile stop by a police officer resulting in 
an altercation, verbal or with fists, whether or 
not arrested or taken into custody; and (4) they 
had ever been charged or convicted of possession 
or distribution of illegal drugs. 
State's brief at 14-15. 
None of these questions went to the heart of Appellant's 
concerns regarding the jurors' attitudes toward marijuana use or 
free agency beliefs. A juror could have held strong views on 
5 
these subjects which coincided or clashed with the views held by 
Shrewsbury and not have been charged with a drug related crime or 
gotten into an altercation with officers. These broad questions 
failed to address the concerns raised in Shrewsbury's questions. 
The questions requested by Appellant were appropriate 
because they would have allowed Shrewsbury to learn whether any 
of the jurors held biases about marijuana use and free agency 
beliefs which might interfere with his or her ability to 
impartially listen to the evidence. Although the State claims 
these questions were directed at nullification and therefore not 
appropriate (State's brief at 9-11), the questions actually would 
have allowed Shrewsbury to determine whether any of these jurors 
were opposed to marijuana use or free agency ideas, thereby 
aiding Shrewsbury in the exercise of his peremptory challenges 
and possibly unearthing a challenge for cause. To the extent 
that these questions also uncovered information that a juror 
believed in jury nullification or favored the use of marijuana, 
the prosecutor would have been free to peremptorily challenge 
those jurors or to attempt a challenge for cause. The attitudes 
of the jurors towards marijuana use and free agency beliefs were 
important areas of information. Questioning jurors about those 
attitudes would have aided Shrewsbury in the intelligent exercise 
of his peremptory challenges. 
In this case where the requested questions were 
appropriate, no other questions elicited the information sought, 
and the failure to ask the questions substantially impaired 
6 
irewsbury's exercise of his peremptory challenges, a new trial 
3 required. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
is convictions and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this Hit day of February, 1996. 
C^c-o)^> 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBERT L. STEELE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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